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Abstract
We study the classic problem of matching n agents to n objects, where the agents have ranked
preferences over the objects. We focus on two popular desiderata from the matching literature:
Pareto optimality and rank-maximality. Instead of asking the agents to report their complete
preferences, our goal is to learn a desirable matching from partial preferences, specifically a
matching that is necessarily Pareto optimal (NPO) or necessarily rank-maximal (NRM) under
any completion of the partial preferences. We focus on the top-k model in which agents reveal
a prefix of their preference rankings. We design efficient algorithms to check if a given matching
is NPO or NRM, and to check whether such a matching exists given top-k partial preferences.
We also study online algorithms to elicit partial preferences adaptively, and prove bounds on
their competitive ratio.
1 Introduction
A fundamental problem in multi-agent systems is resource allocation. Specifically, the problem of
assigning a number of indivisible objects to agents with different preferences has been widely studied
not only in multi-agent systems, but also in economics [21] and theoretical computer science [12].
The focus of our work is the special case of allocating n objects to n agents (so each agent
is matched to a single object), which models many real-world applications. For example, imagine
allocating office spaces to faculty members in a new building. Instead of asking each faculty member
to report a full preference ranking over the available offices, the department head may ask faculty
members to reveal their top choices, and then if need be, he may ask individual faculty members to
reveal their next best choices, and so on. The goal of the department head is to learn a matching
that satisfies some form of “economic efficiency” while asking as few queries as possible. This
idea of using active querying to learn a good solution concept is widely studied in the machine
learning literature [23]. However, our setting imposes an additional key challenge. The department
head needs to be sure that the matching she computes necessarily satisfies the economic efficiency
property she seeks. That is, it must satisfy this property regardless of the parts of the preferences
that were not elicited, because otherwise some faculty may find the final matching undesirable.
What form of economic efficiency might we want from our matching? Luckily, decades of
research in matching theory offers two prominent desiderata: Pareto optimality [11] and rank-
maximality [17, 19]. Pareto optimality is a classic notion that, informally, requires that no other
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matching be able to make some agents better off without making any agent worse off. However, this
is a rather weak guarantee in practice. Hence, a stronger guarantee called rank-maximality is often
used in practical applications such as assigning papers to referees [14], assigning rented resources to
customers [2], and assigning students to schools [3]. Informally, rank-maximality requires matching
as many agents to their top choice as possible, subject to that matching as many agents to their
second choice as possible, and so on. Our goal is to elicit partial preferences of the agents and learn
a matching that is guaranteed to be necessarily Pareto optimal (NPO) or necessarily rank-maximal
(NRM).
1.1 Our Results
We study the next-best query model which allows, in each query, asking one agent to reveal her next
best choice. Partial preferences elicited under this model are referred to as top-k preferences as
each agent reveals a prefix of her preference ranking consisting of the top k items (where k can be
different for each agent). As mentioned above, our goal is to design online algorithms that ask few
queries and learn a matching that is necessarily Pareto optimal or necessarily rank-maximal with
respect to the elicited partial preferences. We study their performance in terms of their competitive
ratio [9].
Note that these algorithms need to check if there already exists a matching that is NPO or
NRM with respect to the elicited preferences in order to decide if further elicitation is required.
Along the way, it is also useful to know if a given matching is NPO or NRM with respect to given
partial preferences. Thus, we also study these two additional questions for NPO and NRM.
For necessary Pareto optimality, we show that checking whether a given matching is NPO
reduces to computing the maximum weight matching in a bipartite graph, which can be solved
efficiently. We also show that there exists an NPO matching if and only if there exists a matching
that matches at least n− 1 agents to objects they have revealed, where n is the number of agents;
this can be checked in polynomial-time, and if this is the case, our algorithm efficiently finds an
NPO matching. Our main result is an online algorithm for finding an NPO matching that has a
competitive ratio of O(
√
n). By proving a matching lower bound, we show that our algorithm is
asymptotically optimal.
For necessary rank-maximality, we design efficient algorithms for checking whether a given
matching is NRM. For checking whether an NRM matching exists; unlike in the case of NPO, these
questions do not seem to reduce to checking a simple analytical condition. In the supplementary
material, we show that a simple characterization can be obtained in the special case where each
agent has revealed exactly the same number of objects. For online elicitation, we show a constant
lower bound on the competitive ratio, and conjecture that the optimal competitive ratio is in fact
constant, unlike in the case of NPO.
1.2 Related Work
There are two approaches to learning a desirable matching given only partial information about
agents’ preferences. One approach is to consider the worst case scenario over missing preferences;
imposing a property X in the worst case leads to the “necessarily X” concept. Another approach is
to assume that the underlying preferences are drawn from a known distribution [22], and consider
the probability of satisfying X [6]. We note that asking whether a matching satisfies X with
probability 1 often falls back to the “necessarily X” concept.
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We focus on the top-k model of partial preferences, which is commonly used in the literature [5,
13]. However, there are also other interesting models; one such model is where the information
available regarding each agent’s preferences is in the form of a set of pairwise comparisons among
objects [6]. In general, the goal of this line of work is to make matching algorithms more practically
relevant, to which our work contributes.
Other than economic efficiency, researchers have also focused on notions of fairness and incentive
compatibility in matching agents to objects, which has led to the design of elegant rules such
as random priority and probabilistic serial [8, 1, 16] that have subsequently been made easily
accessible by not-for-profit endeavors such as MatchU.ai. A related line of research considers
two-sided matching markets, where agents are matched to other agents. Learning from partial
preferences is well-explored in such markets [22, 20].
A bit further afield, there is a large literature on preference learning [10, 7, 4], which aims to
learn agents’ preferences from their actions or from partially revealed preferences. One may consider
using such approaches to learn the missing preferences, and then feeding the complete preferences
into a standard algorithm to compute a matching. In contrast, our approach is to directly learn
a desirable matching from partial preferences so as to lower the computation and data-intensive
costs.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {a1, · · · , an} denote the set of agents and O = {o1, · · · , on} be the set of objects. We use
[k] to denote the set {1, . . . , k}. Thus, for i ∈ [n], ai and oi represent agent and object i respectively.
A matching of agents to objects is a bijection M : N → O. We sometimes refer to a matching as a
collection of pairs {(ai,M(ai) | i ∈ [n])} and use M to denote the set of all possible matchings.
Each agent ai ∈ N has an underlying linear order Ri over O, where a linear order over O is a
transitive, antisymmetric, and total relation on O. We use L(O) to denote the set of all linear orders
over O, and refer to R = (R1, · · · , Rn) ∈ L(O)n as a (complete) preference profile. Additionally, for
i, j, k ∈ [n], if ai prefers oj to ok according to Ri, then we denote this by oj ≻Ri ok or ok ≺Ri oj .
We formally describe two well-established notions of economic efficiency, namely Pareto opti-
mality and rank-maximality.
Definition 1 (Pareto optimality). Given a preference profile R = (R1, . . . , Rn), a matching M
is said to be Pareto optimal with respect to R if no other matching can make an agent happier
without making some other agent less happy, i.e., if
∀M ′ ∈M : (∃ai ∈ N,M ′(ai) ≻Ri M(ai))⇒
(
∃aj ∈ N,M ′(aj) ≺Pj M(aj)
)
.
Definition 2 (rank-maximality). Given a preference profile R and a matchingM , let the signature
of M w.r.t. R, denoted sigR(M), be the tuple (x1, . . . , xn), where xℓ is the number of (ai, oj) ∈M
such that oj is the ℓ
th most preferred choice of ai. We say that (x1, . . . , xn) ≻sig (x′1, . . . , x′n) if there
exists a k ∈ [n] such that xk > x′k and xi = x′i for all i < k; this is the lexicographic comparison of
signatures. A matching M is rank-maximal with respect to R if sigR(M) is maximum under ≻sig.
In plain words, a matching is rank-maximal if it maximizes the number of agents matched to their
top choice, subject to that the number of agents matched to their second choice, and so on.
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2.1 Partial preferences
In this paper, we study a partial preference model called top-k preferences, in which each agent i
may reveal a prefix of her preference ranking, that is, a ranking of her ki most favorite objects for
some ki ∈ [n]. Specifically, agent i may reveal Pi which is a linear order over some L ⊆ O such that
any object in L are preferred to any object in L \O by the agent; we say that agent i has revealed
object o in Pi if o ∈ L. Also, we sometimes use |Pi| = |L| = ki to denote the size of Pi, i.e., the
number of objects revealed in Pi. We refer to P = (P1, . . . , Pn) as a top-k preference profile and
say that a linear order Ri is consistent with Pi if, for all j, k ∈ [n], oj ≻Pi ok ⇒ oj ≻Ri ok. We
use C(Pi) denote the set of linear orders over O that are consistent with Pi, and C(P ) to denote
C(P1)× . . .× C(Pn).
Given a top-k preference profile P = (P1, · · · , Pn), we use rev(P ) to denote the set of all
pairs (ai, oj) such that ai has revealed object oj in Pi, and unrev(P ) to denote (N × O) \ rev(P ).
Throughout, whenever we refer to the size of a matching M w.r.t. to P , we mean |M ∩ rev(P )|.
We are interested in the notion of “necessarily efficient” matchings, which are guaranteed to sat-
isfy an efficiency notion such as Pareto optimality or rank-maximality given only a top-k preference
profile [15, 24, 5].
Definition 3 (necessary Pareto optimality (NPO)). Given a top-k preference profile P , a matching
M is said to be necessarily Pareto optimal with respect to P if it is Pareto optimal with respect to
any profile of linear orders that is consistent with P , i.e., for any R ∈ C(P ).
Definition 4 (necessary rank-maximality (NRM)). Given a top-k preference profile P , a matching
M is said to be necessarily rank-maximal with respect to P if it is rank-maximal with respect to
any profile of linear orders that is consistent with P , i.e., for any R ∈ C(P ).
2.2 Query model and elicitation
We consider learning algorithms that can elicit preferences by asking agents to reveal their “next-
best” objects—meaning if the agent has already revealed their k − 1 most preferred objects, then
it asks the agent to reveal their k-th most preferred object. We formally define this query model
below.
Definition 5 (next-best query model). For ai ∈ N and k ∈ [n], query Q(ai, k), which asks agent
ai to reveal the object in the k-th position in her preference list, is a valid query in the next-best
query model if query Q(ai, j) has already been made for all j ∈ [k − 1].
We are interested in online elicitation algorithms that find NPO or NRM matchings in the
next-best query model and measure their performance against an all-powerful optimal algorithm.
An all-powerful optimal algorithm is a hypothetical offline algorithm that can identify the minimum
number of queries of the form Q(ai, j) that are sufficient to guarantee an NPO or NRM matching.
That is, for i ∈ [n] and ki ∈ [n], the optimal algorithm can minimize ∑i∈[n] ki, and can claim that
asking every agent i for their top-ki order, Pi, is sufficient to compute a matching that is NPO
or NRM w.r.t. all consistent completions of P = (P1, . . . , Pn). We say that an online elicitation
algorithm is α-competitive (or, equivalently, it achieves a competitive ratio of α) if the number of
queries it requires to ask in the worst-case across all possible instances is at most α · OPT, where
OPT is the number of queries asked by the optimal algorithm.
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3 Necessarily Pareto optimal matchings
In this section, we investigate necessarily Pareto optimal (NPO) matchings. We begin, in Sec-
tion 3.1, by presenting an algorithm that determines if a given matching is NPO w.r.t. to a profile
of top-k preferences. Following this, we provide a useful characterization for when NPO matchings
exist. This in turn is used in Section 3.3 in designing an elicitation algorithm that is 2(
√
n + 1)-
competitive. We also show that no elicitation algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio of o(
√
n),
establishing our algorithm as asymptotically optimal.
3.1 Determining whether a matching is NPO
We present a polynomial time algorithm to determine whether a given matching M is NPO w.r.t.
a profile of top-k preferences P . The algorithm, presented as Algorithm 1, proceeds in two steps:
In Step 1, we build a directed graph G = (N,E), where E consists of directed edges (ai, aj) such
that M(ai) ≻Ri M(aj) under some Ri ∈ C(Pi). That is, edge (ai, aj) exists when agent i prefers
the object allocated to agent j over her own under some completion of her partial preferences. In
Step 2, we efficiently check if this directed graph admits a cycle. If it does, matching M is not
NPO; otherwise, it is NPO.
Correctness of the algorithm follows from the observation that if there is a cycle in the directed
graph constructed above, then one can construct a complete preference profile R ∈ C(P ) such that
each agent in the cycle strictly prefers the object allocated to the next agent in the cycle under M .
Then, trading objects along this cycle would result in a matching M ′ that, under this completion
R, Pareto-dominates M , establishing that M is not NPO.
Input: Top-k preference profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn), set of agents N , set of objects O, and matching M .
Output: YES if M is NPO w.r.t. P , and NO otherwise.
1: ⊲ Step 1. Construct a directed graph G = (N,E).
2: E ← ∅
3: for each i ∈ [n] do
4: if (ai,M(ai)) ∈ rev(P ) then
5: For every agent j 6= i such that M(aj) ≻Pi M(ai), add an edge (ai, aj).
6: else
7: For every agent j 6= i, add an edge (ai, aj).
8: end if
9: end for
10: ⊲ Step 2. Check if G has a cycle.
11: if G = (N,E) has a cycle then
12: return NO
13: else
14: return YES
15: end if
Algorithm 1: An algorithm to determine whether a given matching is NPO.
Theorem 1. Given a top-k preference profile P and a matching M , there is a polynomial time
algorithm to check if M is NPO w.r.t. P .
Proof. We claim that Algorithm 1 is such an algorithm. First, let us prove its correctness. The key
observation, which the reader can easily verify, is that the graph G constructed in Step 1 contains
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an edge (ai, aj) if and only if there exists a completion Ri ∈ C(Pi) under which M(aj) ≻Ri M(ai).
This includes edges (ai, aj) for which M(aj) ≻Pi M(ai) is already true under the top-k preference
order Pi.
Suppose the algorithm returns NO. Then, G has a cycle. Let C be one such cycle. Construct
a matching, M ′, from M as follows: if agent i has an outgoing edge (ai, aj) ∈ C in the cycle, set
M ′(ai) =M(aj), and if agent i is not part of cycle C, then set M ′(ai) =M(ai). It is easy to verify
that M ′ is a matching.
Let R = (R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ C(P ) be a completion such that if agent i has an outgoing edge
(ai, aj) ∈ C in the cycle, then Ri ∈ C(Pi) satisfies M ′(ai) = M(aj) ≻Ri M(ai), and otherwise
Ri ∈ C(Pi) is chosen arbitrarily. Then, it is easy to see that for each agent i who is a part of cycle
C, we have M ′(ai) ≻Ri M(ai), and for every remaining agent i, we have M ′(ai) = M(ai). Thus,
M ′ Pareto-dominates M under the completion R ∈ C(P ), which implies that M is not NPO w.r.t.
P , as desired.
Conversely, suppose M is not NPO w.r.t. P . Hence, there exists a matching M ′ and a comple-
tion R ∈ C(P ) such that M ′ Pareto-dominates M under R. We claim that G must have a cycle,
and the algorithm therefore must return NO. To see this, consider the graph G′ = (N,E′) where,
for ai 6= aj , (ai, aj) ∈ E′, if M ′ assigns to agent i the object that was assigned to agent j under
M , i.e., if M ′(ai) =M(aj) 6=M(ai). Note that in G′, each agent i either has exactly one incoming
and one outgoing edge, or no incident edges. Hence, G′ is a union of disjoint cycles. In particular,
G
′ has at least one cycle.
However, since M ′ Pareto-dominates M under R, for every edge (ai, aj) ∈ E′, we have that
M ′(ai) = M(aj) ≻Ri M(ai). Hence, by the observation above, edge (ai, aj) must also exist in G.
Thus, G′ is a subgraph of G. Since G′ has at least one cycle, so does G, as desired.
Finally, we note that Algorithm 1 runs in polynomial time because whether directed graph G
has a cycle can be checked in O(n2) time using depth-first search.
3.2 Computing an NPO matching, when it exists
Next, we find a necessary and sufficient condition for a given top-k preference profile P to admit
an NPO matching. In the case that an NPO matching exists, we also provide an algorithm to
compute one in polynomial time.
Theorem 2. A top-k preference profile P admits an NPO matching if and only if there is a
matching of size at least n−1 w.r.t. P . Moreover, there is a polynomial time algorithm to determine
whether a top-k preference profile admits an NPO matching, and to compute an NPO matching if
it exists.
Proof. (⇒) Consider a top-k preference profile P that admits an NPO matching M . Suppose for
the sake of contradiction that there is no matching w.r.t. P that is of size larger than n− 2. Then,
|M ∩ rev(P )| ≤ n − 2, which implies that there are at least two agents, w.l.o.g. agents a1 and a2,
who are matched to objects they have not revealed under P . It is easy to see that one can now
construct a completion R ∈ C(P ) such that M(a2) ≻R1 M(a1) and M(a1) ≻R2 M(a2). Under this
completion, exchanging the objects assigned to a1 and a2 would Pareto-dominate M , contradicting
the fact that M is NPO w.r.t. P .
(⇐) Let P be a top-k preference profile such that there exists a matching of size at least n−1 w.r.t.
P . Construct a weighted bipartite graph G = (N ∪ O, rev(P )), where each edge (ai, oj) ∈ rev(P )
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has weight equal to the rank of oj in Pi. Let M be a matching of minimum weight among all
matchings of maximum cardinality in G. Note that |M | ≥ n− 1.
Let us first consider the case when |M | = n. If so, then it is easy to see that M is an NPO
matching w.r.t. P . This is because any matching that Pareto-dominates M in any completion
R ∈ C(P ) must have size n w.r.t. P as well and a strictly lower weight than M , which is a
contradiction.
Now, consider the case when |M | = n−1. So exactly one agent and one object are not matched.
Without loss of generality, suppose these are an and on. Construct a matching M̂ of our problem
by adding (an, on) to M . Thus, |M̂ ∩ rev(P )| = |M | = n − 1. We wish to show that M̂ is NPO.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists a matching M ′ which Pareto dominates M̂
w.r.t. some completion R ∈ C(P ). Hence, M ′ must assign each agent an object she prefers (under
R) at least much as what she receives under M̂ , and at least one agent a strictly better (under R)
object than what she receives under M̂ . Thus, M ′, when viewed as a matching in G, must have
cardinality n− 1 and weight at most the weight of M . Further, weight of M ′ is equal to the weight
of M only if M ′ assigns each agent ai 6= an the same object that M̂ assigns. However, any two
matchings that differ must differ in the assignment to at least two agents. Hence, we have that M ′
is a matching in G with cardinality n− 1 and weight strictly less than the weight of M , which is a
contradiction.
Now, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an NPO matching, when it exists.
From the argument above, it is sufficient to be able to compute a min-weight max-cardinality
matching M of the graph G. This can be done in polynomial time. Then, if |M | = n, the
algorithm returns M , and if |M | = n − 1, the algorithm returns M̂ by adding the unmatched
agent-object pair.
3.3 An elicitation algorithm to compute an NPO matching
In this section we turn to the question of elicitation. As mentioned in Section 2.2, we use the next-
best query model, and informally our main goal is to understand how to elicit as little information
as possible in order to compute a necessarily Pareto optimal matching. Towards this end, we first
prove, in Theorem 3, a lower bound that shows that any elicitation algorithm has a competitive
ratio of Ω(
√
n).
Theorem 3. In the next-best query model, if there exists an α-competitive elicitation algorithm for
finding a necessarily Pareto optimal matching, then α ∈ Ω(√n).
Although the main idea in proving the lower bound is fairly straightforward, the formal proof
is somewhat notationally heavy. Therefore, before presenting the proof, we sketch the high-level
idea.
The proof proceeds by constructing a family of instances F , where each instance has the follow-
ing characteristics. First, the n agents are partitioned into
√
n blocks each consisting of
√
n agents
each. Within each block j,
√
n − 2 of the agents have identical preferences. In particular, their
preferences are such that for every such agent ai, ai prefers object oi the most. Additionally, for all
the agents in a block j, expect one special agent, objects ok, where k is a multiple of
√
n, appears
in at least the (n−√n)-th position in their preference list. The special agent in a block j is called
so since this agent has the object oj
√
n in the
√
n-th position in their preference list.
Given the above, the main idea in the proof is to argue that any online algorithm has to find
at least
√
n − 1 of these special agents and that this in turn takes at least Ω(n√n) queries. The
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a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16
o1 o2 o3 o1 o5 o6 o7 o5 o9 o10 o11 o9 o13 o14 o15 o13
o2 o1 o1 o2 o6 o5 o5 o6 o10 o9 o9 o10 o14 o13 o13 o14
o3 o3 o2 o3 o7 o7 o6 o7 o11 o11 o10 o11 o15 o15 o14 o15
o5 o4 o5 o5 o1 o8 o1 o1 o1 o12 o1 o1 o9 o16 o9 o9
o6 o5 o6 o6 o2 o1 o2 o2 o2 o1 o2 o2 o10 o9 o10 o10
o7 o6 o7 o7 o3 o2 o3 o3 o3 o2 o3 o3 o11 o10 o11 o11
o9 o7 o9 o9 o9 o3 o9 o9 o5 o3 o5 o5 o1 o11 o1 o1
o10 o9 o10 o10 o10 o9 o10 o10 o6 o5 o6 o6 o2 o1 o2 o2
o11 o10 o11 o11 o11 o10 o11 o11 o7 o6 o7 o7 o3 o2 o3 o3
o13 o11 o13 o13 o13 o11 o13 o13 o13 o7 o13 o13 o5 o3 o5 o5
o14 o13 o14 o14 o14 o13 o14 o14 o14 o13 o14 o14 o6 o5 o6 o6
o15 o14 o15 o15 o15 o14 o15 o15 o15 o14 o15 o15 o7 o6 o7 o7
o4 o15 o4 o4 o4 o15 o4 o4 o4 o15 o4 o4 o4 o7 o4 o4
o8 o8 o8 o8 o8 o4 o8 o8 o8 o4 o8 o8 o8 o4 o8 o8
o12 o12 o12 o12 o12 o12 o12 o12 o12 o8 o12 o12 o12 o8 o12 o12
o16 o16 o16 o16 o16 o16 o16 o16 o16 o16 o16 o16 o16 o12 o16 o16
Figure 1: Preferences of the agents (presented in columns) constructed in the proof of Theorem 3 illustrated
for the case where n = 16 and tj = 2 for each j. The special agents are {a2, a6, a10, a12}.
proof of this fact employs an adversary argument and can be informally summarized as follows:
an adversary can keep “hiding” a special agent until an online algorithm makes Ω(n) queries, and
since the algorithm has to find at least
√
n− 1 special agents, this takes Ω(n√n) queries. Once we
have this, then the bound follows by observing that an optimal algorithm just needs to make O(n)
queries for any instance in this family.
Proof of Theorem 3. For the ease of presentation, assume that n is a perfect square. Let us define
useful sets of indices. For all j ∈ [√n] and t ∈ [√n− 1], define
Nj =
{
(j − 1)√n+ 1, · · · , j√n− 1} ,
N−tj = Nj \ {(j − 1)
√
n+ t}.
Additionally, define
S = {√n, 2√n, . . . , n},
U = {1, . . . , n}.
For any set of indices P , we use OP to denote the set of all objects ok such that k ∈ P . Finally,
when we use a set of objects in describing the preference ranking of an agent over objects, it should
implicitly be replaced by a ranking of all objects in the set in the increasing order of their indices.
We are now ready to define our family of instances F . Fix t1, . . . , t√n ∈ [
√
n − 1], which will
parametrize a particular instance in F . Let us denote the corresponding instance I(t1,...,t√n), under
which agent preferences are as follows. For all j ∈ [√n]:
For agent ak, where k ∈ N−tjj : ok ≻ ON−k
j
≻ OU\(Nj∪S) ≻ OS ,
For agent ay, where y = (j − 1)
√
n+ tj : oy ≻ ON−y
j
≻ oj·√n ≻ OU\(Nj∪S) ≻ OS\{j·√n},
For agent aj·√n : ONj ≻ OU\(Nj∪S) ≻ OS .
Figure 1 illustrates an example of this construction when n = 16 and tj = 2 for each j.
In order to simplify terminology, let us say that agent ai belongs to Nj∪{j
√
n} if i ∈ Nj∪{j
√
n}.
Also, we refer to the agents in Nj ∪ {j
√
n} as the agents in block j. Thus, there are √n blocks of
8
agents in total. Finally, we refer to agent (j − 1) · √n + k as the k-th agent in block j, and agent
(j−1) ·√n+ tj as the special agent in block j. Figure 1 highlights the special agents for a particular
instance.
Recall that our family F consists of (√n − 1)
√
n instances that are parametrized by indices
t1, . . . , t√n. These indices specify which agent in each block is the special agent. Thus:
F =
{
I(t1,··· ,t√n) | t1, . . . , t√n ∈ [
√
n− 1]
}
.
We are now ready to contrast online algorithms with the optimal algorithm. By the optimal
algorithm, we refer to an omniscient algorithm that knows the complete underlying preference
profile, and on any instance, can make the minimum possible number of queries in the next-best
query model to reveal an NPO matching. Let OPT denote the maximum number of queries made
by the optimal algorithm across all instances in F .
Claim 1. OPT ≤ 3n− 2√n.
Proof. Let us consider an arbitrary instance I(t1,··· ,t√n) in F . Note that the optimal algorithm
has access to the complete preferences of the agents. To the agents in each block j, the optimal
algorithm can make the following queries.
• To the special agent (i.e. the tj-th agent), it makes
√
n queries.
• To agent aj√n, it makes
√
n queries.
• To every other agent in block j, it makes a single query.
Note that the number of queries made to agents in block j is at most 2·√n+(√n−2)·1 = 3√n−2.
Since there are
√
n blocks, the total number of queries made is at most
√
n · (3√n− 2) = 3n− 2√n,
as desired.
Finally, we need to show that the preference elicited through these queries reveal an NPO
matching. Using Theorem 2, we need to show that there is a matching of size at least n− 1 w.r.t.
the elicited preferences. In fact, we argue that there is a matching of size n w.r.t. the elicited
preferences.
Consider the following matching M . For every j ∈ [√n] and y = (j − 1)√n+ tj, let
M(ay) = oj
√
n, M(aj
√
n) = oy, M(ak) = ok for every k ∈ N−tjj .
This matching has size n w.r.t. the elicited preferences because
√
n queries made to agents ay
and aj
√
n reveal objects oj
√
n and oy in their preferences, respectively, and the single query made to
every other agent ak in block j reveals her top choice ok. This completes the proof of the claim.
The claim above showed that an omniscient algorithm can make linearly many queries and
reveal an NPO matching on any instance from F . In contrast, the next claim shows that an online
algorithm must make Ω(n
√
n) queries to find an NPO matching on some instance in F . Formally,
fix an online algorithm, and let ALG denote the maximum number of queries it makes across all
instances in F .
Claim 2. ALG ≥ (√n− 1)(n− 2√n).
Proof. For each j ∈ [√n], let tj be defined as follows.
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• If the algorithm makes at least √n queries to all agents in block j, the tj-th agent in block j
is the last agent in block j to receive the
√
n-th query.
• Otherwise, it is an arbitrary value such that the tj-th agent in block j has not been made
√
n
queries.
Consider the corresponding instance I(t1,...,t√n). Note that this is an adversarially chosen in-
stance depending on the way the online algorithm makes queries. This is well-defined because until
the algorithm makes the tj-th agent in block j its
√
n-th query, it cannot distinguish which agent in
block j is the special agent; hence, if all agents in block j receive at least
√
n queries, the adversary
can make the last agent in block j to receive the
√
n-th query the special agent.
When the online algorithm terminates, it returns an NPOmatching. Hence, by Theorem 2, there
must be a matching, say M , of size at least n− 1 w.r.t. the elicited preferences at termination. In
particular, M must match at least
√
n − 1 of the √n objects in OS to distinct agents who have
revealed them. We use this to show that the algorithm must have made at least (
√
n−1)(n−2√n)
queries on this instance.
Let O∗ ⊆ OS denote the set of objects in OS who are matched to agents who reveal them; note
that |O∗| ≥ √n− 1 (i.e. |O∗| ∈ {√n− 1,√n}). For each oj√n ∈ O∗, we consider two cases.
1. oj
√
n is matched to the special agent in block j. In this case, the algorithm must have made
the tj-th agent in block j at least
√
n queries. Thus, by the construction of the adversarial
instance, it must have made each of
√
n agents in block j at least
√
n queries. In this case,
we “charge” these
√
n · √n = n queries made by the algorithm to object oj√n.
2. oj
√
n is matched to an agent other than the special agent in block j. Note that this agent
may not be in block j. Since any such agent puts oj
√
n in a position later than n −
√
n, the
algorithm must have made at least n−√n queries to this agent. We “charge” the last n−2√n
of these queries to object oj
√
n. Note that we are not charging the first
√
n queries made to
this agent may have already been charged to a different object through the first case above.
Hence, each object in O∗ is charged at least n− 2√n unique queries. Since |O∗| ≥ √n− 1, the
algorithm must have made at least (
√
n− 1) · (n− 2√n) queries, as desired.
Finally, using the two claims above, we have that
ALG
OPT
≥ (
√
n− 1)(n − 2√n)
3n− 2√n ∈ Ω(
√
n).
Hence, the competitive ratio of any online algorithm is Ω(
√
n).
A natural strategy to elicit preferences is to simultaneously ask all the n agents to reveal
their next best object until the point at which the designer has enough information to compute a
necessarily Pareto optimal matching. Recall that we can check the latter condition at every step
by leveraging our Theorem 2 from Section 3.2. Although this approach is natural, it is not difficult
to see that it results in a competitive ratio of Ω(n).
Let us describe the high-level idea of our algorithm (Algorithm 2), although the exact details
vary slightly in the algorithm in order to optimize the competitive ratio. We follow the aforemen-
tioned naïve approach of asking all agents to report their next best object only up to a point where
we can match at least n − √n agents to objects they have revealed. At that point, we compute
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Input: A profile of top-k preferences P = (P1, . . . , Pn), a set of agents N , and a set of objects O.
Output: An NPO matching
1: for each i ∈ [n], initialize Pi = ∅
2: M← ∅; k← 1; s← |M|
3: while s < (n− 1) do
4: if s ≤ (n− 1)−min({k − 1,√n}) then
5: for each i ∈ [n] do
6: o← Q(ai, |Pi|+ 1) ⊲ asking ai for their next preferred object
7: update Pi by adding object o at position |Pi|+ 1
8: end for
9: else if s > (n− 1)−min({k − 1,√n}) then
10: while s < (n− 1) do
11: U ← the set of unmatched agents in M
12: for each i ∈ U do
13: o← Q(ai, |Pi|+ 1)
14: update Pi by adding object o at position |Pi|+ 1
15: end for
16: end while
17: end if
18: k ← k + 1
19: M← max. matching in G (N ∪O, rev(P )), where P = (P1, · · · , Pn)
20: s← |M|
21: end while
22: use algorithm described in Theorem 2 to return a matching that is NPO w.r.t. P = (P1, · · · , Pn)
Algorithm 2: A 2(
√
n+ 1)-competitive elicitation algorithm
one such matching, focus on the unmatched agents (at most
√
n of them), and then just ask these
agents for their next best object until there is a matching of size at least n−1, which, by Theorem 1,
is a sufficient condition for the existence of an NPO matching. Once we know an NPO matching
exists, we use the polynomial-time algorithm from Theorem 1 to find one. This strategy, with the
details optimized, results in an improved competitive ratio of 2(
√
n + 1), which given Theorem 3,
is asymptotically optimal.
Theorem 4. Algorithm 2 is a 2(
√
n + 1)-competitive elicitation algorithm in the next-best query
model for computing a necessarily Pareto optimal matching.
In order to prove this result, we first introduce the following notation. We maintain a graph
G = (N ∪O, rev(P )), where P denotes the top-k preference profile elicited so far. Let sj denote the
size of the maximum matching in this graph during the j-th iteration of line 3. Next, let m denote
the number of times lines 4–8 are run in Algorithm 2. Note that m ≥ 1 (since s1 = 0 and hence
lines 4–8 are executed at least during the first iteration), and that the total number of iterations of
the algorithm is m+1 (since the ‘else if’, i.e., lines 9–17 is executed just once). Also, note that for
all j ∈ [m], sj is also the size of the maximum matching when all agents have revealed their top
(j − 1) objects in Algorithm 2. Finally, for j ∈ [m], let Xj denote the number of agents who are
asked at least j queries by the optimal algorithm. Now, we have the following claim.
Claim 3. For every j ∈ [m], Xj ≥ (n− sj − 1).
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists j ∈ [m] such that Xj < n − sj − 1.
This implies that the remaining n−Xj agents have been asked at most j−1 queries by the optimal
algorithm. Let L denote the set of these n−Xj agents.
11
Now, by Theorem 2, the optimal algorithm must elicit preferences that admit a matching of
size at least n− 1. In such a matching, at least n−Xj − 1 of the agents in L must be matched to
an object they have revealed, i.e., to one of their top j − 1 objects. Thus, during the j-th iteration
of line 3, there was a matching of size at least n−Xj − 1 > sj. This contradicts the fact that sj is
defined as the size of the maximum matching during the j-th iteration.
Equipped with the notations and the claim above, we can now prove our theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let ALG denote the number of queries asked in Algorithm 2 and m be as
defined above. Since the algorithm asks n queries during each time lines 4–8 is run and it asks at
most (n − sm+1) · (n −m) queries during the execution of lines 9–17 (the first term is maximum
number of agents in set U in line 11 and the second arises from the fact that all these agents have
revealed their top m preferences), we have that
ALG ≤ n ·m+ (n− sm+1) · (n −m) < n ·m+ (min({m,
√
n}) + 1) · (n−m), (1)
where the second step follows from the fact that (n − sm+1) < (1 + min({m,
√
n})) (see line 9 in
Algorithm 2).
Next, let OPT denote the number of queries asked by the optimal algorithm. From Claim 3
we know that Xj , which is the number of agents who are asked at least j queries by the optimal
algorithm, is at least (n− sj). Therefore, we have that,
OPT ≥ m ·Xm +
m−1∑
j=1
(m− j) · (Xm−j −Xm−j+1)
= Xm +Xm−1 + · · · +X1
≥ n− 1 +
m∑
j=2
(n− sj − 1) (using Claim 3 and the fact that s1 = 0)
≥ n− 1 + (m− 1) · (n− sm − 1) (since ∀j ∈ [m], sj ≤ sj+1)
≥ n− 1 + (m− 1) ·min({m− 1,√n}), (2)
where the final inequality follows from the fact that (n − 1 − sm) ≥ min({m − 1,
√
n}) (see line 4
in Algorithm 2). Therefore, using (1) and (2), we have
ALG
OPT
≤ n ·m+ (min({m,
√
n}) + 1) · (n−m)
n− 1 + (m− 1) ·min({m− 1,√n}) ≤ 2(min({m,
√
n}) + 1),
where the last inequality can be seen by using the facts n ≥ 2, m ≥ 1, and by considering the cases
m ≤ √n and m > √n.
4 Necessarily rank-maximal matchings
In the previous section, we devised algorithms for computing an NPO matching when one exists
given a top-k preference profile, and for eliciting a small amount of information to determine such
matchings. Here, we focus on rank-maximality, which is a stronger notion of economic efficiency
than Pareto optimality and widely used in real-world applications. To illustrate this notion, consider
the top-k preference profile P with three agents, where P1 = o1 ≻ o2 ≻ o3, P2 = o1 ≻ o2 and P3 = o1.
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The matching M = {(a1, o3), (a2, o2), (a3, o1)} is NPO, but not NRM. To see this, consider the
completion R of P , where R1 = o1 ≻ o2 ≻ o3, R2 = o1 ≻ o2 ≻ o3, and R3 = o1 ≻ o3 ≻ o2. While
M has signature (1, 1, 1) under R, matching M ′ = {(a1, o1), (a2, o2), (a3, o3)} has a better signature
(1, 2, 0) under R. In fact, it is easy to verify that M ′ is NRM with respect to P .
We begin, in Section 4.2, by presenting an algorithm that determines whether a given matching
is necessarily rank-maximal (NRM) w.r.t. a given top-k preference profile. In Section 4.3, we build
upon this algorithm to design another algorithm that decides if a given top-k preference profile
admits an NRM matching, and computes one if it does. Finally, we turn to the elicitation question,
where we provide a lower bound on the competitive ratio of any elicitation algorithm that returns
an NRM matching. We first introduce necessary additional notation.
Extended signature. Following Definition 2, we define the extended signature of a matching M
w.r.t. P , denoted extsigP (M), to be the tuple (x1, . . . , xn), where, for all i ∈ [n − 1], xi is defined
as in sigP (M), while xn counts not only the number of agents matched to their n
th choice revealed
in P , but also the number of agents matched to an object they did not reveal in P .
Optimal signature. Given a top-k preference profile P over a subset of agents S ⊆ N and a
subset of objects T ⊆ O, as well as a set of “forbidden” pairs F ⊆ S×T , letM(S, T, F ) denote the
set of all matchings M that match agents in S to objects in T and satisfy M ∩ F = ∅. We define
sigoptP (S, T, F ) = supM∈M(S,T,F ),R∈C(P ) sigR(M). Informally, this is the best possible signature that
any matching can achieve under any completion of P while avoiding pairings from F . We use
arg sigoptP (S, T, F ) to denote the matching M ∈ M(S, T, F ) that obtains this best signature under
some completion R ∈ C(P ). Note that sometimes we use sigoptP to denote sigoptP (N,O, ∅).
Rank-maximality w.r.t. top-k preferences. Given a top-k preference profile P and a match-
ing M , let the signature of M w.r.t. P , denoted sigP (M), be the tuple (x1, . . . , xn), where xℓ is the
number of (ai, oj) ∈ M ∩ rev(P ) such that oj is the ℓth most preferred choice of ai. We say that
(x1, . . . , xn) ≻sig (x′1, . . . , x′n) if there exists a h ∈ [n] such that xh > x′h and xi = x′i for all i < h;
this is the lexicographic comparison of signatures. A matching M is rank-maximal with respect to
P if sigP (M) is maximum under ≻sig. In plain words, a matching is rank-maximal with respect
to partial preference profile P if it maximizes the number of agents matched to their top choice,
subject to that the number of agents matched to their second choice, and so on.
4.1 Efficiently computing optimal signatures
First, we show that sigoptP (S, T, F ) can be computed efficiently. This follows more-or-less directly
from the work of Irving et al. [18], who define rank-maximal matchings more generally for weak
preference orders, in which several objects can be tied at the same position in the preference ranking
of an agent. The signature of a matching with respect to a weak order profile still encodes, for
all ℓ, the number of agents who are matched to one of the objects in the ℓth position in their
preference list. Irving et al. [18] construct an edge-labeled bipartite graph G, where edge (ai, ok)
has label ℓ if ok appears in position ℓ in agent ai’s weak preference order. By doing so, they extend
the notion of rank-maximal matchings to such edge-labeled bipartite graphs. We note that their
efficient algorithm to compute a rank-maximal matching for such a graph remains valid even when
some of the edges of the graph are deleted, as we do in Algorithm 3.
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Input: A top-k preference profile P over a set of agents S ⊆ N and a set of objects T ⊆ O, and F ⊆ S × T .
Output: sigoptP (S, T, F ) and arg sig
opt
P (S, T, F )
1: For all ai ∈ S, let ki ← |Pi|
2: P ′ ← weak order profile which matches P on the preferences revealed under P , and for every (ai, oj) ∈
unrev(P ), has object oj at position ki + 1 in P
′
i
3: Create a bipartite graph G = (S ∪ T, E), where E = S × T \ F , and each edge (ai, oj) ∈ E is labelled with ℓ
if oj appears in position ℓ in P
′
i .
4: M ← compute a rank-maximal matching of G using the algorithm by Irving et al. [18]
5: return sigP ′(M) and M
Algorithm 3: Algorithm to compute sigoptP (S, T, F ) and arg sig
opt
P (S, T, F ).
Lemma 1. Given a top-k preference profile P over a set of agents S ⊆ N and a set of objects
T ⊆ O, and a set of pairs F ⊆ S × T , Algorithm 3 computes sigoptP (S, T, F ) and arg sigoptP (S, T, F )
in polynomial time.
Proof. First, note that Algorithm 3 runs in polynomial time because the algorithm of Irving et al.
[18] runs in polynomial time. Hence, we only argue the correctness of our algorithm below.
Let {ki : ai ∈ S}, P ′, and G be as described in Algorithm 3. Recall that M(S, T, F ) is the set
of matchings that match agents in S to objects in T without using any pairs of agent-object from
F .
First, we claim that for any matching M ∈M(S, T, F ), sigP ′(M) = supR∈C(P ) sigR(M). To see
this, note that the contribution of all pairs (ai, ok) ∈M ∩ rev(P ) to the signature sigR(M) is fixed
regardless of R. Thus, the best signature is achieved under the completion R in which, for every
(ai, ok) ∈M ∩ unrev(P ), object ok appears at position ki+1 in ai’s preference ranking. This is pre-
cisely what occurs under the weak order profile P ′ as well. Hence, sigP ′(M) = supR∈C(P ) sigR(M).
Taking supremum over M ∈M(S, T, F ) on both sides, we have that
sup
M∈M(S,T,F )
sigP ′(M) = sup
M∈M(S,T,F )
sup
R∈C(P )
sigR(M).
By definition, our algorithm computes the LHS, while the RHS is equal to sigoptP (S, T, F ).
4.2 Determining whether a matching is NRM
At a high level, our algorithm to determine if a given matching M is NRM under a given top-k
preference profile P works as follows. It leverages the fact that given any S ⊆ N , T ⊆ O, and
F ⊆ S × T , we can efficiently compute sigoptP (S, T, F ) (Lemma 1).
Given this, our algorithm first checks if M has size at least n− 1 w.r.t. P ; this is necessary for
M to be even NPO w.r.t. P , as the proof of Theorem 2 shows. If M has size n w.r.t. P , then we
argue that its siganture w.r.t. P (which is the same as its signature w.r.t. any completion R of P )
must be sigoptP . On the other hand, supposeM has size n−1 w.r.t. P , with (ai, oj) ∈M ∩unrev(P )
being the pair where an agent is matched to an object she did not reveal under P . Then, we argue
that two conditions need to be met: (a) to ensure that another matching M ′ with (ai, oj) ∈ M ′
cannot have a better signature under any completion R, we require that the signature of M w.r.t.
P be at least as good as sigoptP (N \ {ai} , O \ {oj} , ∅), and (b) to ensure that another matching
M ′ with (ai, oj) /∈ M ′ cannot have a better signature under any completion R, we require that
the extended signature of M w.r.t. P be at least as good as sigoptP (N,O, {(ai, oj)}). The detailed
algorithm is presented as Algorithm 4.
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Input: A top-k preference profile P , a set of agents N , a set of objects O, and a matching M .
Output: Is M NRM w.r.t. P ?
1: c← |M ∩ rev(P )|.
2: if c = n and sigP (M) = sig
opt
P then
3: return YES
4: else if c = n− 1 then
5: Pick (ai, oj) ∈M ∩ unrev(P ) ⊲ this is unique since M has cardinality n− 1 w.r.t. P .
6: if sigP (M) sig sigoptP (N \ {ai}, O \ {oj}, ∅) and extsigP (M) sig sigoptP (N,O, {(ai, oj)}) then
7: return YES
8: end if
9: end if
10: return NO
Algorithm 4: Algorithm to check if a given matching is NRM given a top-k preference profile.
Theorem 5. Given a top-k preference profile P and a matching M , there exists a polynomial-time
algorithm that determines if M is NRM w.r.t. P .
Proof. To prove this, we will show that Algorithm 4 returns YES if and only if M is NRM w.r.t.
P .
(⇒) Suppose Algorithm 4 returns YES. Then, one of two conditions is met: (1) M is a perfect
matching w.r.t. P and sigP (M) = sig
opt
P ; we refer to this as Case (a) below; or (2) M is of size n−1
w.r.t. P , sigP (M) sig sigoptP (N \ {ai}, O \ {oj}, ∅), and extsigP (M) sig sigoptP (N,O, {(ai, oj)}); we
refer to this as Case (b) below. Next, we argue that in both cases, M is NRM w.r.t. P .
Case (a). Since M is a perfect matching w.r.t. P , note that, for all R ∈ C(P ), sigP (M) =
sigR(M). Combined with the fact that sig
opt
P = sigP (M), we have that sig
opt
P = sigR(M) for all
completions R ∈ C(P ). Since sigoptP is the best signature that any matching can have under any
completion of P , this implies that M is rank-maximal w.r.t. every completion of P , i.e., that it is
NRM w.r.t. P .
Case (b). Let (ai, oj) ∈ M ∩ unrev(P ). Also, let M1 ⊆ M be the set of matchings that match
ai to oj (i.e. (ai, oj) ∈M1 for every M1 ∈M1), andM2 =M\M1 be the set of matchings which
match ai to an object other than oj.
First, we show that for any R ∈ C(P ) and M1 ∈ M1, sigR(M) sig sigR(M1). Suppose for
contradiction that there exist M1 ∈ M1 and R ∈ C(P ) such that sigR(M1) ≻sig sigR(M). Since
(ai, oj) ∈M1 and (ai, oj) ∈M , we have that sigR(M ′1) ≻sig sigR(M ′), whereM ′1 =M1\{(ai, oj)} and
M ′ =M \{(ai, oj)}. This in turn implies sigoptP (N \{ai}, O\{oj}, ∅) sig sigR(M ′1) ≻sig sigR(M ′) =
sigP (M), where the first transition follows from the definition of sig
opt
P (N \ {ai}, O \ {oj}, ∅) and
the last transition follows from the fact that (ai, oj) ∈ unrev(P ) does not affect the signature of M
under P . However, this contradicts the fact that sigP (M) sig sigoptP (N \ {ai}, O \ {oj}, ∅).
Next, we show that for any R ∈ C(P ) and M2 ∈ M2, sigR(M) sig sigR(M2). Suppose for
contradiction that there exist M2 ∈ M2 and R ∈ C(P ) such that sigR(M2) ≻sig sigR(M). This in
turn implies sigoptP (N,O, {(ai, oj)}) sig sigR(M2) ≻sig sigR(M) sig extsigP (M), where the first
transition follows from the definition of sigoptP (N,O, {(ai, oj)}) and the fact that (ai, oj) /∈M2, and
the last transition follows from the definition of extsigP (·). However, note that this contradicts the
fact that extsigP (M) sig sigoptP (N,O, {(ai, oj)}).
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Finally, since we showed that sigR(M) sig sigR(M ′) for every M ′ ∈M1 ∪M2 =M and every
R ∈ C(P ), we have that M is rank-maximal w.r.t. every completion of P , i.e., that it is NRM w.r.t.
P .
(⇐) Suppose that M is NRM w.r.t. P . Then, it must be NPO w.r.t. P as well. Hence, as we
show in the proof of Theorem 2, M must have size at least n− 1 w.r.t. P . So, we again have the
following two cases. Either M is a perfect matching w.r.t. P , which we refer to as Case (a) below,
or M is of size n− 1 w.r.t. P , which we refer to as Case (b) below.
Case (a). First, observe that sigP (M) = sigR(M) for all R ∈ C(P ) because M is a perfect
matching w.r.t. P . Second, since M is NRM w.r.t. P , it is rank-maximal under every completion
of P . Hence, sigP (M) is the best signature any matching can have under any completion of P , i.e.,
sigP (M) = sig
opt
P . Thus, Algorithm 4 must return YES in line 3.
Case (b). Let (ai, oj) ∈M∩ unrev(P ). Next, let us considerM1 = arg sigoptP (N \{ai}, O\{oj}, ∅)
and let R ∈ C(P ) be the completion at whichM1 attains the signature sigoptP (N \{ai}, O\{oj}). We
will show that sigP (M) sig sigoptP (N \ {ai}, O \ {oj}, ∅). To see this, let us assume that this is not
the case and that sigoptP (N \{ai}, O\{oj}, ∅) = sigR(M1) ≻sig sigP (M). Next, letM ′1 =M1∪{ai, oj},
and let us consider the completion R′ ∈ C(P ) which is the same as R, except that oj is moved to
the nth position in the preference list of ai. Since M ∩ unrev(P ) = {(ai, oj)}, (ai, oj) ∈ M1, and
sigR(M1) ≻sig sigP (M), one can see that sigR′(M ′1) ≻sig sigR′(M). Hence, M is not rank-maximal
w.r.t. R′, which contradicts the fact that M is NRM w.r.t. P . Therefore, we have that
sigP (M) sig sigoptP (N \ {ai}, O \ {oj}, ∅). (3)
Finally, let us consider M2 = arg sig
opt
P (N,O, {(ai, oj)}), and let R ∈ C(P ) be the completion at
whichM2 attains the signature sig
opt
P (N,O, {(ai, oj)}). Since (ai, oj) /∈M2, consider the completion
R′ ∈ C(P ) which is the same as R, except object oj is moved to the nth position in the preference
list of ai. Note that sigR′(M2) sig sigR(M2) = sigoptP (N,O, {(ai, oj)}). However, since M is NRM
w.r.t. P , we also have extsigP (M) = sigR′(M) sig sigR′(M2). Hence, we have
extsigP (M) sig sigoptP (N,O, {(ai, oj)}). (4)
Observations (3) and (4) together imply that Algorithm 4 will return YES in line 7.
This establishes the correctness of Algorithm 4. To see that the algorithm runs in polynomial
time, it is sufficient to observe that Algorithm 3 runs in polynomial time.
4.3 Computing an NRM matching, when it exists
The results from Section 4.2 are key to devising an algorithm that determines if a given top-k
preference profile admits an NRM matching and computes one if it does. Specifically, note again
that a matching that is NRM w.r.t. a top-k preference profile P must have size at least n− 1 w.r.t.
P . If there is an NRM matching of size n w.r.t. P , then we argue that it must be rank-maximal
w.r.t. P and have signature sigoptP . We can check this efficienty using the results of Section 4.2. If
there is an NRM matching of size n− 1 w.r.t. P with (ai, oj) ∈M ∩ unrev(P ), then we argue that
M \ {(ai, oj)} must be a rank-maximal matching of N \ {ai} to O \ {oj} w.r.t. P . By iterating
over all agent-object pairs (ai, oj), we can again check this efficiently. The algorithm is formally
presented as Algorithm 5.
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Input: A top-k preference profile P , a set of agents N , and a set of objects O.
Output: Returns an NRM matching if P admits one, and returns NO otherwise.
1: M ′ ← rank-maximal matching w.r.t. P
2: if |M ′ ∩ rev(P )| = n and sigP (M) = sigoptP then
3: return M ′
4: else
5: for (ai, oj) ∈ unrev(P ) do
6: X ← rank-maximal matching of N \ {ai} to O \ {oj} w.r.t. P
7: M ′ ← X ∪ {(ai, oj)}
8: if M ′ is NRM w.r.t. P then ⊲ use Algorithm 4
9: return M ′
10: end if
11: end for
12: end if
13: return NO
Algorithm 5: Algorithm to check if an NRM matching exists given a top-k preference profile.
Theorem 6. Given a top-k preference profile P , there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that
returns a necessarily rank-maximal matching if one exists, and returns NO otherwise.
Proof. We want to show that P admits an NRM matching if and only if Algorithm 5 returns a
matching (i.e. does not return NO). Moreover, in case that the algorithm returns a matching, we
want to show that it is in fact NRM w.r.t. P .
(⇒) Let M be an NRM matching w.r.t. P . Then, it must be NPO w.r.t. P as well. Hence, as we
show in the proof of Theorem 2, M must have size at least n− 1 w.r.t. P . So, we again have the
following two cases. Either M is a perfect matching w.r.t. P , which we refer to as Case (a) below,
or M is of size n− 1 w.r.t. P , which we refer to as Case (b) below.
Case (a). Observe that sigP (M) = sigR(M) for all R ∈ C(P ) since M is a perfect matching w.r.t.
P . Second, note that sigP (M) = sig
opt
P , since otherwise it follows from the definition of sig
opt
P that
there is a matching M ′ and a completion R ∈ C(P ) such that sigR(M ′) ≻sig sigR(M) = sigP (M),
which in turn contradicts the fact that M is NRM w.r.t. P . Finally, it is easy to see that since M
has size n w.r.t. P and it is NRM w.r.t. P , it has to be rank-maximal w.r.t. to P . Combining these
observations, we have that any matching M ′ that is a rank-maximal matching w.r.t. P must have
size n and the same signature (under P ) as sigoptP . Hence, the check in line 2 will succeed, and the
algorithm will return matching M ′, which is NRM w.r.t. P .
Case (b). Let (ai, oj) ∈ M ∩ unrev(P ). As in Case (a), we can argue that M \ {(ai, oj)} is
necessarily rank-maximal w.r.t. P among all matchings that match N \ {ai} to O \ {oj}. Let X
be any matching of N \ {ai} to O \ {oj} that is rank-maximal w.r.t. P . Then, this implies that
X∪{(ai, oj)} is also an NRM matching. Observe that this is precisely the condition that is checked
in line 8 of Algorithm 5. Hence, the algorithm returns an NRM matching w.r.t. P in this case too.
(⇐) Suppose P does not have an NRM matching. Note that Algorithm 5 returns a matching only
under two cases. First is when there is a matching M ′ such that M ′ is of size n w.r.t. P and has
the same signature as sigoptP . Note that if such a matching exists, then it is easy to see from the
definition of sigoptP and the fact that M
′ is a perfect matching w.r.t. P that it has to be NRM w.r.t.
P , which in turn contradicts our assumption that P does not have an NRM.
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The other case is when Algorithm 5 returns a matching in line 9, and here, the proof trivially
follows from Theorem 5, which proves the correctness of Algorithm 4.
Finally, it is easy to see that since Algorithms 3 and 4 run in polynomial time, Algorithm 4,
too, runs in polynomial time.
4.4 Elicitation to compute an NRM matching
We are now ready to consider the question of eliciting information in the next-best query model
in order to compute a necessarily rank-maximal matching. Below we prove a lower bound on the
competitive ratio of any elicitation algorithm.
Theorem 7. In the next-best query model, for n ≥ 2, if there exists an α-competitive elicitation
algorithm for finding a necessarily rank-maximal matching, then α ≥ 43 − 2n , if n is even, and
α ≥ 43 − 209n−3 , if n is odd.
Proof. Let us first consider the case when n is even. Let us partition the set of agents N and the set
of objects O in the following way. For t ∈ [n/2], we define Nt =
{
at, an/2+t
}
and Ot =
{
ot, on/2+t
}
.
Also, for t ∈ [n/2], we refer to Nt as a block. Note that N = ∪n/2t=1Nt and O = ∪n/2t=1Ot.
Next, consider a family of instances F defined as follows. For each t ∈ [n/2], both agents in Nt
have ot as their top choice; the second choice for one of the agents in Nt (an agent who we will refer
to as special ) is on/2+t, while that of the other agent is oy, where y = (t+1) mod (n/2). The rest
of the preferences are filled in arbitrarily. Note that this family has 2n/2 instances.
Now, let us consider an arbitrary instance I in F . It is easy to verify that I has a unique
rank-maximal matching described as follows: for each t ∈ [n/2], the agent in Nt with on/2+t as her
second choice is matched to on/2+t, while the other agent in Nt is matched to ot (her top choice).
Next, we argue that on this family of instances, any online algorithm for finding an NRM
matching has to make at least 2n − 3 queries. To see this, recall that an NRM matching is also
NPO, and therefore, must have, because of Theorem 2, a size at least (n − 1) w.r.t. the elicited
preferences. This implies that the algorithm must make at least 2n−3 queries, since in all the blocks
Nt except one, the algorithm must find an agent who reveals on/2+t, but the first agent to whom
the algorithm asks for her second choice may end up revealing oy, where y = (t + 1) mod (n/2),
thus necessitating another query. In other words, in at least (n/2− 1) blocks, the algorithm must
make at least 4 queries each, and in the last block, the algorithm must make at least 1 query, which
adds up to 2n− 3.
In contrast, the offline optimal may ask all the n/2 special agents two queries each and all
the other agents a single query, thus making a total of 3n/2 queries; it is easy to verify that the
rank-maximal matching in the underlying preferences will be a necessarily rank-maximal matching
given such elicited preferences.
Therefore, combining all observations above, we have that, when n is even, the competitive
ratio of any online algorithm is at least 2n−33n/2 =
4
3 − 2n .
Finally, let us consider the case when n is odd and let n = n′ + 1, where n′ is even. We can
consider an agent a∗ and an object o∗ separately and let o∗ be the top choice of a∗ but the last
choice of every other agent. We use the constructed described above (for the case when have even
number of agents and objects) to construct the preferences for the the other agents (i.e., every agent
except a∗). Given this, it is easy to see that both the offline optimal and the online algorithm have
one additional query to make (asking a∗ her top choice); it then follows that the offline optimal
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makes 3n
′
2 + 1 =
3n−1
2 queries, while any online algorithm must make at least 2n
′ − 3 + 1 = 2n− 4
queries. Hence, when n is odd, the competitive ratio is at least 2n−4(3n−1)/2 =
4
3 − 209n−3 .
Note that our lower bound converges to 43 as n goes to infinity. Given this, the natural question
is whether one can design an online algorithm to compute an NRM matching that has constant
competitive ratio. We conjecture that this should be possible, but leave it as an open problem for
future work.
5 Discussion
As discussed in Section 4, the most immediate open question that stems from our work is to design
an online elicitation algorithm to compute an NRM matching, and analyze its competitive ratio.
In particular, we believe that there should exist an algorithm with a constant competitive ratio.
Note that our online algorithm to compute an NPO matching from Section 3 is a constructive
procedure, and uses our result that the existence of an NPO matching can be reduced to a simple
analytical condition. Given that such a simple condition seems out of reach for the case of NRM, it
may be interesting to explore a different approach to designing an online algorithm to compute an
NRM matching. For example, one can train a deep neural network to select which agent to query
next as a function of the preferences elicited so far. At each step, we can first use this algorithm to
make one more query, and then call our efficient algorithm to check if the elicited preference reveal
an NRM matching. It would be interesting to study if this approach can lead to a low competitive
ratio, at least in practice.
More broadly, the literature on learning a desirable matching of agents to objects from partial
preferences or historical data is still in its infancy, and many interesting directions, such as studying
other models of partial preferences or other models of querying agents, remain unexplored.
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